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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines environmental regulation politics in terms of proactive lobbying at different levels of 
public environmental management, namely enacting legislation and implementing policies. In the proposed models, 
effectiveness of environmental regulation is captured by (i) level of stringency of environmental regulations, (ii) degree of 
enforcement, and (iii) the achievement of various environmental performance goals. Findings from cross-country 
regressions support the capture theory where small size and greater availability of resources render industrial groups in 
SIDS powerful at the legislation level. Rent-seeking behaviour of industrial lobbies appears to be channeled via corrupt 
practices but is constrained by high dependence of SIDS on international trade as well as improved governance measures 
and better rule of law. No evidence is obtained on environmental legislative damage caused by agricultural lobbies and 
tourism sector. At the implementation level, both industry and agriculture are found to be pro-active in terms of non-
compliance to environmental legislations causing significant damage to the environment. Weak agricultural lobbies at 
legislative level in SIDS may be due to extensive government support programs to agriculture, which would serve to 
dampen or nullify any increment in cost borne by farmers arising from stringent environmental regulations. The impact of 
tourism lobbies on environmental performance is inconclusive. Tourism lobbies in SIDS have interest in maintaining 
some level of environmental quality and do not display severe adverse impacts at the implementation phase even after 
controlling for their interaction with institutional variables (corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness).  
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1. Introduction and extension of current research 
Empirical research on the impact of political economy factors on the effectiveness of environmental 
regulation is fairly recent and fast-growing. This paper empirically examines environmental regulation 
politics in terms of proactive lobbying at different levels of public environmental management, namely 
enacting legislation and implementing policies. The principal objective of this exercise is to examine the role 
of sector-wise lobbies in circumventing the legislative and enforcement policies resulting in lower 
environmental performance in industrial, agricultural and tourism activities. This dimension of political 
economy of environmental regulation has not been attempted in the literature. Eliste and Fredriksson (2002), 
however, focus on the relationship between trade, environmental regulation and the behavior of agricultural 
lobbies. Agricultural share in GDP and agricultural labour are employed as proxies for farmer group power. 
Using cross-country data on stringency of environmental regulations, the authors find that environmental 
regulation has influenced production subsidies allocated to agricultural producers as compensation for rise in 
costs associated with pollution taxes. 2SLS estimates reveal that agricultural share significantly lowers 
environmental stringency and environmental stringency increases producer subsidies. Agricultural labour 
which would prefer regulation however is not significant in their models.   
A rapidly expanding literature nevertheless exists investigating the relationship between institutional 
failure and environmental regulation. The direct negative impact of corruption on degree of environmental 
stringency finds support in the literature (for example, Damania, 2002; Fredriksson and Svenson, 2003; 
Damania et al., 2003). The complex indirect channels of influence of corruption have also been explored and 
tested. For instance, Fredriksson and Svenson (2003) develop a theoretical framework which predicts that the 
effect of corruption on the stringency of environmental policy would be conditional on the degree of political 
instability. An interaction variable between instability and corruption is added to their models to test this 
contention. With stringency of environmental regulations in the agricultural sector in 1990 as dependent 
variable, they find that corruption significantly reduces the stringency of environmental regulations, but the 
effect is lowered as the degree of political instability increases. This would imply that the incentive to offer a 
bribe is reduced when its expected return falls in the presence of political stability. Bribery becomes less 
attractive when a producer perceives that there is little likelihood that the government would remain in office 
throughout the implementation stage.  
Damania et al. (2003) explore the relationship between environmental policy, corruption and trade 
liberalization by developing an endogenous model of environmental policy determination. Their framework 
predicts that the effect of trade on environmental stringency would be conditional upon the level of 
corruption. The interaction depends on whether protectionism and corruption are complements or substitutes 
in environmental policy distortions.   The authors employ panel data over years 1982 to 1992 and grams of 
lead content per gallon of gasoline as proxy used for environmental stringency to test their hypothesis. They 
find that more stringent standards and regulations are adopted when a country becomes open. Moreover, the 
significantly positive sign on the interaction between corruption and openness indicates that corruption 
amplifies the positive effect of international trade on regulatory stringency, ceteris paribus. Distorted trade 
policies (corruption) increase the effect of a reduction of corruption (trade liberalization) on lead content in 
gasoline. Thus, protectionism and corruption appear to be complements in the creation of environmental 
policy distortions.  
Findings on the effects of democracy and freedom as institutional measures are found to be inconclusive 
and sensitive to specifications used and methods of estimation.  For instance, Eliste and Fredrikson (2002) 
find that democracy and the civil liberties index are found to enter insignificantly in all their specifications. 
Fredriksson and Svenson (2003), on the other hand, obtain weak negative impact of democracy on 
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environmental regulatory outcomes in some models while in some coefficients on democracy does not differ 
insignificantly from zero.  
2. The empirical model 
It is posited that quantity of effective regulation observed at any point of time is the outcome of some 
equilibrium between demand and supply forces.  Demand for regulation is derived from the welfare of agents 
served by the regulation. They can be individuals, firms and environmental groups. Supply of regulation is a 
function of rents, probability of re-election and psychological costs of officials providing effective regulation. 
Thus, 
Demand for regulation 
 
ENVREGi = f (political pricei, incomei)                            (1) 
 
Supply of regulation 
 
ENVREGi = f (political gaini, social welfare goalsi)         (2) 
 
where ENVREG is total effective regulation in country i. Political price paid by economic agents in society 
can be in the form of monetary currency, votes or other kinds of benefits. Income in the demand function 
would enable us to ascertain that environmental quality and associated levels of environmental regulatory 
performance are normal goods. Political gains to public officials in the supply function include rents and 
probability of re-election. Contrary to the general trend in the political economy literature, public officials are 
allowed to be motivated by social welfare goals as well. These may include achievement of economic growth, 
trade openness, degree of competitiveness in the international trade, income distributional motives and 
adequate protection against certain environmental hazards.    
The political price variable is not directly observable.  We conjecture that the magnitude of rents collected 
by government officials would be constrained by institutional performance and resources spent by interest 
groups to capture policymakers or bureaucrats.  In other words, institutional quality and capture in years prior 
to the implementation of the environmental policy are used as proxies for political rents.   
A simultaneous framework is assumed wherein the level of effective enforcement of environmental 
regulations is determined. At equilibrium, political price paid by the society equals political gain. In order not 
to lose information on the impact of endogenous political gains on environmental regulatory performance, 
reduced form equations are not estimated. The approach employed here is to focus on the supply of 
environmental regulations. The major finding of this part of the analysis is that some lobbies such as industry 
take special interest in softening the environmental legislations and also damaging the environment, given 
these legislations. On the other hand, agricultural and tourist lobbies are found to be more active at the 
implementation level and contribute significantly to environmental degradation. 
In the proposed framework, two environmental damage functions (EDF) are derived from the regulation 
supply function, namely environmental legislative damage function (ELDF) and environmental quality 
damage function (EQDF).  
 
ELDFi = (CAPTUREi, INSTi, INCOMEi)  (3) 
 
EQDFi = (CAPTUREi, INSTi, INCOMEi) (4) 
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The vector CAPTURE in models (3) and (4) includes agricultural, tourist and industrial lobby groups having
impact on the environmental legislations and environmental quality, respectively. Following Fredriksson and 
Svensson (2003) and Madhoo (2004), share of a sector in GDP can be used as proxy of group power. The
vector of INST is a measure of institutional performance (degree of corruption, government effectiveness and
rule of law). INCOME is a control variable. It can measure growth and social welfare. i stands for country 
observation.
Hypothesis 1: It is postulated that pressure groups and lobbies engage in environmental damaging
activities first by influencing and weakening environmental legislations and then continue with their 
production and business activities while the legislations are in order. In a first stage, the damaging effect of 
lobby group j on environmental legislations can positive, zero or negative. Thus,
∂ELDFi/∂CAPTUREij  for j  = agriculture, industry and tourist lobbies
The effective impact of capture by the different lobby groups on environmental legislations
(∂ELDFi/∂CAPTUREij) would depend upon the power of the group and expected profit effects of lobbying
activities. In line with the capture theory, we predict a positive significant impact on ELDF of small-sized and 
resourceful lobbies engaging in activities with high pollution intensity. The more powerful is the group, the
higher the success in causing damage to environmental legislations (∂ELDFi/∂CAPTUREij > 0) and vice
versa.
Similarly, ∂EQDFi/∂CAPTUREij for j  = agriculture, industry and tourist lobbies
Hypothesis 2: We hypothesise that the more effective and transparent are institutions, the less feasible it 
will be for bureaucrats to extract rents. In other words, degree of environmental damage (EDF) chosen by a
corrupt bureaucrat in an inefficient system will be typically higher than that of an honest one operating in a
more efficient institutional setup.
∂EDFi/∂INSTik ≤ 0    where k = measure of institutional quality (transparency, government effectiveness,
rule of law)
where EDF represents damage at the legislative level (ELDF) and damage at the implementation level
(EQDF). Moreover, institutions may limit or enhance the lobbying activities in terms of environmental
damage as follows:
∂EDFi/∂INSTik = ∂EDFi/∂INSTik |CAPTUREij+ ∂EDFi/∂INSTik× ∂INSTik / ∂CAPTUREij
The first term in the above equation measures the direct impact of institutional quality k on environmental
damage for a given level of capture effort by lobby group j. A negative sign is expected on the coefficient of 
this variable. The second interactive term captures the impact of institutions in the presence of lobbying
activities of pressure group j. A positive sign on this variable would demonstrate that lobbying efforts in 
producing environmental damage completely offset the limiting impacts of good institutions.
Hypothesis 3: Growth promotion in particular may have non-linear impacts on environmental regulations.
We expect a positive impact of growth in producing environmental damage in the early stages of economic
development of a country where environment may be viewed largely as an input in the production process. As
a country achieves higher level of development, we predict a turning point beyond which growth
enhancement and environmental protection would be compatible. At this later stage, development would be
less environmentally intensive. Economic growth motives may also conflict with public officials’ desire for 
higher rents. This trade-off is captured by allowing for interactive welfare and political gains terms. While the
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direct effect of political gains would serve to reduce the effectiveness of regulations, the indirect effect may 
work through the interaction between political and social welfare goals of the regulator, having stimulating or 
dampening impact on political rent seeking behaviour.  
3. Data sources and construction of variables 
Indicators of the softness and strictness of environmental legislations are not available. Indices of 
environmental policy, namely degree of enforcement of environmental regulations (ENVENF) and stringency 
of regulations (ENVSTRINGENCY) in year 2008 are taken as proxy for softness and strictness of 
environmental legislations. It uses the information generated by the World Economic Forum (2009) based on 
survey information on perceptions of national authorities, international agencies and private sources  These 
two indicators range from 1 to 7 in value, where 1 indicates weakest level of regulatory enforcement or 
stringency and 7 corresponds to the best perceived environmental legislation. These indicators are separately 
used as dependent variable, one measuring the degree of enforcement in environmental legislations and the 
other capturing the stringency of environmental legislations. 
Indices of environmental performance on humans and nature as indicators of the effectiveness of 
environmental regulatory policies are taken as environmental quality variables. These include the 
environmental performance index (EPI), environmental health (ENVHEALTH) and ecosystem vitality 
(ECOSYSTEM).  EPI is constructed from various sub-indicators on Environmental health and Ecosystem 
vitality by Esty et al. (2008). Policy sub-categories considered to compute the environmental health index 
include the environmental burden of disease, and the effects of water and air pollution on human beings. 
Ecosystem vitality is generated from various sub-categories focusing on impacts on nature. Examples are air 
pollution and water (effects on nature), biodiversity and habitat conservation, productive natural resources 
(e.g. fisheries and forestry) and the impact on climate change.  
Measures of institutional performance are obtained from the World Resources Institute Website and 
Transparency International (2006) for corruption (CORRUPT), and from Kaufmann et al. (2008) for 
government effectiveness (GOVEFF) and rule of law (RULE). The corruption index measures the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is constructed as the reverse of 
the degree of transparency index and ranges from 0 to 10, where CORRUPT = 0 indicates non-existence of 
corruption. The government effectiveness index comprises indicators that measure the efficiency and 
impartiality of the civil service and the quality of public infrastructure and the bureaucratic framework. The 
Rule of Law index is another measure of good governance or government effectiveness. It is constructed from 
perceptions on the incidence of crime, judicial quality and honesty, and the enforceability of contracts. A 
value of -2.5 for government effectiveness and rule of law corresponds to worst governance, zero is average 
governance and +2.5 is best governance. 
The lobby groups, considered to test the validity of the capture theory, are the agricultural, tourism and 
industrial sectors. The power of these lobbies is measured by percentage share in GDP of value added of 
agriculture, tourist receipts, and value added of the industrial sector, respectively. Social welfare promoting 
policies of the government include growth policies, trade liberalization, vulnerability measures and income 
distribution goals. GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars from World Development Indicators is used to 
test the impact of growth on effectiveness of environmental regulations. Dataset on vulnerability index can be 
obtained from Briguglio (1995). Average income inequality (GINI) and data on population are available at the 
World Resources Institute Website. Degree of openness is computed as the ratio of exports plus imports in 
GDP. Data on these variables are obtained from the WRI Website.  
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4. Findings and implications for policy 
Cross-country regressions using SIDS data confirm that the perceived degree of enforcement and 
stringency of environmental regulations are adversely impacted by corruption in SIDS at the legislative level 
while better rule of law and government effectiveness would be conducive to stronger legislations (Tables 1-
4). Moreover, our results highlight the importance of the industrial sector in SIDS as an important lobby 
power in dampening the effectiveness of regulations. This finding supports the capture theory where small 
size of the industry and trade group and availability of resources would render them more powerful at the 
legislation level. Results from interactive models confirm our suspicion about rent-seeking behaviour of the 
industry lobby channeled via corrupt practices (Tables 2-4). However, this negative impact is effectively 
dampened by the high dependence of small island countries on international trade. The exposure to trade 
apparently acts a compliance promoting factor. Better governance and rule of law emerge as additional 
constraints to capture effort by industrial lobbies. Contrary to industry, agricultural and tourism sector lobbies 
are not found aiming at environmental legislative damage (Tables 1-4). 
 
Table 1: Environmental regulatory policies and the capture theory 
 
 Dependent  Variable: Log(ENVENF08) Dependent Variable: Log(ENV STRINGENCY08) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.2122*** 
(5.5667) 
2.2043*** 
(5.5192) 
2.6065***  
(3.5205) 
1.5659*** 
(5.6157) 
1.7309*** 
(5.4737) 
2.3246*** 
(5.3429) 
LGDPPC9506 -0.2771*** 
(-3.5216) 
-0.3642*** 
(-3.4791) 
-0.2889* 
(-1.7314) 
-0.1213* 
(-1.8287) 
-0.2214*** 
(-2.6741) 
-0.2145* 
(-1.8579) 
LGDPPC2 0.02351*** 
(5.4939) 
0.0306*** 
(4.6254) 
0.0250** 
(2.3346) 
0.0123** 
(2.2045) 
0.0214*** 
(4.1134) 
0.0196** 
(2.6350) 
SIDS -0.1338** 
(-2.1510) 
  -0.1264** 
(-2.5493) 
  
Non-SIDS LDC -0.1069 
(-1.5721) 
  -0.1256** 
(-2.0897) 
  
SIDS*AGR9506  0.0027 
(0.4530) 
0.0011 
(0.1707) 
 0.0020 
(0.7235) 
0.0004 
(0.2126) 
SIDS*TOURIST95
06 
 0.0036 
(0.5811) 
0.0111 
(0.8905) 
 0.0018 
(0.6866) 
0.0075 
(0.7454) 
SIDS*IND9506  -0.0052* 
(-1.9752) 
-0.0100** 
(-2.5032) 
 -0.0041** 
(-2.1166) 
-0.0081** 
(-2.5081) 
LPOP9506   0.0090 
(0.4351) 
  0.0042 
(0.2789) 
Vulnerability   0.1951 
(0.5516) 
  0.0235 
(0.0822) 
LGini9205   -0.2328* 
(-1.7858) 
  -0.1748* 
(-1.7730) 
Open9506   0.0012** 
(2.0650) 
  0.0011** 
(2.5983) 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.59 0.58 0.70 
N 130 126 71 130 126 71 
Estimation Method White White OLS White White OLS 
Source: Author 
Notes: (i) LGDPPC9505 is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at constant prices averaged over the years 1995 to 2006. SIDS is a 
dummy for small island states. AGR9506 and IND9506 correspond to average percentage share of agriculture and industry in GDP, 
respectively.  TOURIST9506 is measured as the ratio tourism receipts in GDP (in percent over years 1995 to 2006).  Institutional 
indicators are averaged over years 1996 to 2006.    Vulnerability index is reported in Briguglio (1995) based on Human Development 
Index (HDI), trade dependence and proneness to disasters. GINI measures degree of inequality averaged over 1992 to 1995. OPEN9506 
is the share of exports plus imports in GDP.. Estimation method is indicated in the column before last. White’s robust heterosedasticity 
statistics are reported in ( ) parentheses wherever heteroscedasticity was detected.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  N is number of observations. 
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Table 2: Environmental legislation, capture and political institutions in SIDS   
 
 Dependent  Variable: Log(ENVENF08) Dependent Variable: Log(ENV STRINGENCY08) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.1216*** 
(5.3000) 
2.1471*** 
(5.4232) 
2.1210*** 
(5.3673) 
1.6655*** 
(4.6517) 
1.6592*** 
(4.5822) 
1.6703*** 
(4.7136) 
LGDPPC9506 -0.3409*** 
(-3.2449) 
-0.3423*** 
(-3.3126) 
-0.3404*** 
(-3.2841) 
-0.2031** 
(-2.1620) 
-0.1988** 
(-2.1032) 
-0.2041** 
(-2.1965) 
LGDPPC2 0.0291*** 
(4.3687) 
0.0290*** 
(4.4407) 
0.0290*** 
(4.4220) 
0.0201*** 
(3.3858) 
0.0198*** 
(3.3164) 
0.0202*** 
(3.4318) 
SIDS*AGR9506 0.0135 
(1.3412) 
0.0018 
(0.1015) 
0.0128* 
(1.7110) 
0.0117 (1.3063) -0.0029 
(-0.1772) 
0.0094 
(1.3979) 
SIDS*TOURIST95
06 
0.0033 
(0.4739) 
0.0004 
(0.0605) 
-0.0050 
(-0.6979) 
0.0023 
(0.3780) 
0.0007 
(0.1006) 
-0.0044 
(-0.6802) 
SIDS*IND9506 -0.0047 
(-0.8216) 
-0.0068** 
(-2.1284) 
-0.0074** 
(-2.4742) 
0.0036 
(0.7067) 
-0.0049** 
 (-2.0369) 
-0.0057** 
 (-2.1144) 
SIDS*CORRUPT9
606 
-0.0778* 
(-1.7906) 
  -0.0660* 
(-1.7679) 
  
SIDS*GOVEFF960
6 
 0.1462 
(1.5322) 
  0.0951* 
(1.7802) 
 
SIDS*RULE9606   0.2533** 
(2.1776) 
  0.1843* 
(1.9668) 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 
N 123 118 126 123 118 126 
Source: Author   Notes: As for Table 1.  Estimation method: OLS except model 5 where White’s method is used. 
 
Table 3: Institutional performance and industrial lobby interactions: investigating their impacts on the effectiveness of environmental 
regulations in SIDS 
 
 Dependent  Variable: Log(ENVENF08) Dependent Variable: Log(ENV 
STRINGENCY08) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.1287*** 
(5.3176) 
2.1332*** 
(5.3426) 
2.1154*** 
(5.3641) 
1.6740**** 
(4.6712) 
1.6746*** 
(4.6974) 
1.6659*** 
(4.7080) 
LGDPPC9506 -0.3430*** 
(-3.2651) 
-0.3440*** 
(-3.2830) 
-0.3388*** 
(-3.2756) 
-0.2056 
(-2.1866) 
-0.2054** 
(-2.1962) 
-0.2029** 
(-2.1864) 
LGDPPC2 0.0292***  
(4.3912) 
0.0293*** 
(4.4105) 
0.0289*** 
(4.4151) 
0.0178 
(1.9344)* 
0.0203*** 
(3.4242) 
0.0201*** 
(3.4228) 
SIDS*AGR9506 0.0106 
(1.2015) 
0.0079 
(1.1712) 
0.0128* 
(1.7550) 
0.0088 
(1.2985) 
0.0061 
(1.0209) 
0.0094 
(1.4389) 
SIDS*TOURIST95
06 
-0.0220 
(-1.0184) 
0.0024 
(0.4004) 
-0.0014 
(-0.2257) 
-0.00048  
(-0.5788) 
0.0010 
(0.1785) 
-0.0018 
(-0.3145) 
SIDS*IND9506 0.0111 
(1.3550) 
-0.0077** 
(-2.3693) 
-0.0088*** 
(-2.7338) 
0.0041 
(1.0218) 
-0.0060** 
(2.0853) 
-0.0067** 
(-2.3212) 
SIDS*IND9506*C
ORRUPT9606 
-0.0041* 
(-1.7911) 
  -0.0018*  
(-1.6892) 
  
SIDS*IND9506*G
OVEFF9606 
 0.0043 
(1.6020) 
  0.0034* 
(1.6889) 
 
SIDS*IND9506*RU
LE9606 
  0.0080** 
(2.2980) 
  0.0058* 
(1.8732) 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.59 
N 123 126 126 123 126 126 
Source: Author          Notes: As for Table 1.  Estimation method: White 
 
Table 4: Interactive models in the presence of openness in SIDS 
 
 Dependent  Variable: Log(ENVENF08) Dependent Variable: Log(ENV 
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STRINGENCY08) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.1211*** 
(6.2017) 
2.1474*** 
(6.2818) 
2.1255*** 
(6.2403) 
1.6653*** 
(5.2202) 
1.6854*** 
(5.2877) 
1.6748*** 
(5.2692) 
LGDPPC9506 -0.3408*** 
(-3.7983) 
-0.3487*** 
(-3.8872) 
-0.3423*** 
(-3.8331) 
-0.2031** 
(-2.4306) 
-0.2091** 
(-2.5043) 
-0.2060** 
(-2.4759) 
LGDPPC2 0.0291*** 
(5.1433) 
0.0296*** 
(5.2590) 
0.0292*** 
(5.2083) 
0.0201*** 
(3.8455) 
0.0206*** 
(3.9289) 
0.0204*** 
(3.9044) 
SIDS*AGR9506 -0.0005 
(-0.0691) 
0.0058 
(1.5823) 
0.0134*** 
(4.2171) 
-0.0018 
(-0.3172) 
0.0051** 
(1.9620) 
0.0098*** 
(6.3842) 
SIDS*TOURIST95
06 
0.0016 
(0.5242) 
0.0045 
(0.9115) 
-0.0021 
(-0.7711) 
0.0011 
(0.5212) 
0.0019 
(0.5661) 
-0.0022 
(-0.9854) 
SIDS*IND9506 0.0003 
(0.0955) 
-0.0076*** 
(-4.6910) 
-0.0088*** 
(-7.3977) 
-0.0010 
(-0.4155) 
-0.0061*** 
(-4.4079) 
-0.0067*** 
(-7.4984) 
SIDS*IND9506*C
ORRUPT9606 
-0.0021*** 
(-4.6909) 
  -0.0017*** 
(-4.7476) 
  
SIDS*IND9506* 
CORRUPT9606* 
OPEN9506 
1.14E-05** 
(1.9051) 
 
  1.10E-05** 
(2.4108) 
  
SIDS*IND9506**G
OVEFF9606 
 -0.0011 
(-0.1811) 
  0.0007 
(0.1673) 
 
SIDS*IND9506 
*GOVEFF9606*O
PEN9506 
 1.40E-05 
(1.0301) 
  6.83E-06 
(0.7252) 
 
SIDS*IND9506*RU
LE9606 
  0.0092*** 
(3.0065) 
  0.0066** 
(2.3259) 
SIDS*IND9506*C
ORRUPT9606*OP
EN9506 
  -3.67E-06 
(-0.5560) 
  -2.18E-06 
(-0.3780) 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.59 
N 123 126 126 123 126 126 
Source: Author          Notes: As for Table 1. Estimation Method: White 
 
At the implementation level, we find that both industry and agriculture contribute to environmental 
degradation (tables 5 and 6). The impact of tourism on environmental performance is not clear and is sensitive 
to specifications used. However, the behavior of agricultural lobby needs explanation. The lack of 
environment damage activity of the agricultural sector at the legislative level may be explained in terms of 
extensive government support to that sector in SIDS (in the form of subsidies, etc.). This support serves to 
dampen or nullify any increment in cost borne by farmers due to stronger environmental regulations. Thus, 
stronger regulations do not necessarily lead to better environmental performance outcomes. 
The upshot of the paper is that industrial lobbies are pro-active both at the legislation and implementation 
levels and there is a sectoral level non-compliance strategy at work. Agricultural lobbies appear inactive at the 
legislative level but proactive at the level of implementation. The paper highlights the environmental policy 
challenges in island economies in the light of empirical results. As against command and control policy 
instruments, market-based incentives may offer more chance of success. Moreover, subsidy policy needs to be 
linked to environmental performance of the agricultural sector. The seemingly environmental friendly 
behavior of tourism even though inconclusive can be explained by the high environmental intensity of tourism 
activities. It can be conjectured that maintaining the quality of environment is part of the international tourism 
business strategy. 
 
Table 5: Environmental performance in SIDS  
 
 Log(EPI) Log(ENVHEALH) Log(ECOSYSTEM) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 2.4890*** -1.4398** 4.9713*** 
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(10.1364) (-1.8785) (19.535) 
LGDPPC9506 0.3896*** 
(6.2301) 
1.3126*** 
(6.9251) 
-0.1889*** 
(-2.6240) 
LGDPPC2 -0.0195*** 
(-5.0223) 
-0.0711*** 
(-6.2318) 
0.0115** 
(2.3651) 
SIDS -0.0670** 
(-2.4474) 
-0.0065 
(-0.0882) 
-0.1123*** 
(-2.7503) 
Non-SID LDC 0.0413 
(1.2341) 
-0.0147 
(-0.1324) 
0.1047* 
(1.8918) 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.61 0.10 
N 147 147 151 
Source: Author    Estimation method: White. 
 
Table 6: Political economy of environmental performance in SIDS  
 
 Dependent variable:  Log(EPI) Dependent variable: Log(ECOSYSTEM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.6649*** 
(7.9835) 
2.6550*** 
(7.9787) 
2.6679*** 
(8.0070) 
4.7800*** 
(14.449) 
4.7533*** 
(14.375) 
4.7827*** 
(14.452) 
LGDPPC9506 0.4481*** 
(5.6778) 
0.4481*** 
(5.6848) 
0.4479*** 
(5.6889) 
-0.2104** 
(-2.6097) 
-0.2104** 
(-2.5976) 
-0.2106** 
(-2.6207) 
LGDPPC2 -0.0234*** 
(-4.8786) 
-0.0234*** 
(-4.8840) 
-0.0234*** 
(-4.8880) 
0.0142*** 
(2.7121) 
0.0142*** 
(2.6994) 
0.0142*** 
(2.7284) 
SIDS*AGR9506 -0.0111*** 
(-5.6435) 
-0.0012 
(-0.7941) 
-0.0011 
(-0.7523) 
-0.0169*** 
(-7.0924) 
-0.0074** 
(-2.8282) 
-0.0020 
(-0.8579) 
SIDS*TOURIST950
6 
0.0037  
(0.9993) 
0.0025 
(0.8584) 
0.0072*** 
(2.7922) 
0.0095* 
(1.7791) 
-0.0011 
(-0.2170) 
0.0078 
(1.4941) 
SIDS*IND9506 -0.0248*** 
(-5.7208) 
-0.0025*** 
(-4.8472) 
-0.0035*** 
(-6.4920) 
-0.0521*** 
(-10.653) 
-0.0005 
(-0.4155) 
-0.0059*** 
(-8.3498) 
SIDS*CORRUPT96
06 
-0.0201 
(-1.5346) 
  -0.0829*** 
(-6.1615) 
  
SIDS*IND9506* 
CORRUPT9606 
-0.0049*** 
(-6.4486) 
  -0.0109*** 
(-3.0151) 
  
SIDS*GOVEFF960
6 
 0.0229 
(0.2689) 
  0.6373*** 
(5.3470) 
 
SIDS*IND9506* 
GOVEFF9606 
 -0.0045** 
(-2.4568) 
  -0.0194*** 
(-7.5469) 
 
SIDS*RULE9606   0.0204 
(0.2379) 
  0.2520** 
(2.0454) 
SIDS*IND9506* 
RULE9606 
  -0.0039 
(-1.6441) 
  -0.0135*** 
(-4.1041) 
LPOP9506 -0.0014 
(-0.1841) 
-0.0009 
(-0.1257) 
-0.0014 
(-0.1827) 
-0.0280*** 
(-3.2567) 
-0.0271*** 
(-3.1496) 
-0.0279*** 
(-3.2216) 
LGini9205 -0.0996*** 
(-2.3522) 
-0.0978** 
(-2.3190) 
-0.0995** 
(-2.3567) 
0.1491** 
(2.6166) 
0.1535** 
(2.6906) 
0.1492** 
(2.6131) 
Open9506 0.0001 
(0.6253) 
0.0001 
(0.5585) 
0.0001 
(0.4936) 
-0.0008** 
(2.2943) 
-0.0008** 
(-2.2487) 
-0.0009** 
(-2.5036) 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.16 0.17 0.17 
N 151 125 125 123 125 125 
Source: Author    Notes: As for Table 1. Estimation method: White.   
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Shyam Nath for instructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.  
541 Yeti Nisha Madhoo /  Procedia Economics and Finance  5 ( 2013 )  532 – 541 
References 
Becker, G.S., 1983. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400. 
Buchanan, M., Tullock, G., 1975. Polluters’ profit and political response: Direct controls versus taxes, American Economic Review 65, 
139–147. 
Damania, R., 2002. Environmental controls with corrupt bureaucrats, Environment and Development Economics 7:407-427 
Damania, R., Fredriksson, P.G., List, J.A., 2003. Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: Theory and 
evidence, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46: 490-512. 
Dasgupta, S., Mody, A., Roy, S., Wheeler, D., 1995. Environmental regulation and development: A cross-country empirical analysis, 
Policy Research Working Paper 1448. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Eliste, P., Fredriksson, P.G., 2002. Environmental regulations, transfers, and trade: Theory and evidence, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 43: 234-250. 
Fredriksson, P.G., Svensson, J., 2003. Political instability, corruption and policy formulation: The case of environmental policy, Journal 
of Public Economics 87: 1383-1405. 
Goulder, Lawrence H., Parry, Ian W., 2008. Instrument choice in environmental policy, Discussion Paper RFF DP 08-07, Resources for 
the Future, Washington, D.C.  
Hackett, Steven C., 2006. Environmental and Natural Resources Economics: Theory, Policy, and the Sustainable Society, 3rd Ed.. New 
York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M.,  2008. Governance matters VII: Aggregate and individual governance indicators, 1996-2007, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4654.  Available online at: http://go.worldbank.org/2E0SXCR850. 
Keohane, Nathaniel O., Revesz, Richard L., Stavins, Robert N., 1998. The positive political economy of instrument choice in 
environmental policy, Harvard Environmental Law Review 22: 313-67.  
Madhoo, Y. N., 2004. Political economy of water pricing policy: Empirical evidence from public utilities in Mauritius, Water Resources Research 
40, W07301, doi:10.1029/2003WR002903: 1-9.  
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Ostrom, E., 1992. The rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of common-property institutions, in D.W. Bromley 
(editor), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy. San Francisco: ICS Press. 
Peltzman, S., 1976. Toward a more general theory of regulation, Journal of Law and Economics 19: 211-40.  
Stigler, G.J., 1971. Theory of economic regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: 3-21. 
Transparency International, 2006. 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin: Transparency International. (Available online at  
http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi) 
World Economic Forum, 2009. The Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report 2008. (Available online at 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/CGR08/Rankings.pdf) 
World Resources Institute Website. http://www.earthtrends.org 
